Absorbed in James Forder’s Phillips curve myth

An outstanding book.

It was my first thought after reading James Forder’s seminal work ‘Macroeconomics and the Phillips curve myth‘. Dr. Forder breaks down a plethora of age-old fallacies written in the historiography of economics and reshapes the 20th century history of our discipline.

Personally, I am not a researcher of the Phillips curve per se. Only two chapters of this long story are most interesting for me, Friedman’s and Lucas’ Phillips curves, which are highly influential episodes of the story. I clearly remember, I was afraid to start reading the book a couple of weeks ago, because Dr. Forder promises his readers to get the facts straight. This is his very program: to read everything that belongs to the Phillips curve literature and correct all the errors we inherited from the previous decades. And this is the program Dr. Forder accomplishes.

For me personally, the most interesting part is the chapters in which the author clears up the true role of Milton Friedman‘s Nobel lecture in the distortion of the history of the Phillips curve and how Friedman came up with a brand new narrative. This was a shocking experience to realize that the commonly believed story is Friedman’s invention. In Friedman’s reading the Phillips curve was a high-ranked constituent of both theoretical economics and economic policy discussions from the early post-war years. In Friedman’s account, the Phillips curve was the most important analytical tool of Keynesian economics and Friedman places the blame on the Phillips curve (and the believers) for all the allaged mistakes of theoretical economics and economic policy. In a nutshell, it is failure of the Phillips curve that economics derailed – and Friedman’s ambition was to put economics back on the right track. His soultion was the inclusion of expectations in order to call attention to the fact that there is no stable trade-off between inflation and unemployment. On the contrary, Phillips’ contribution was only one element in the vast literature on the trade-off between inflation and employment/unemployment (and what is more, not the most important or most inspiring one) and the Phillips-curve was not widely used in Keynesian economics to argue for inflationary politics in favour of lower unemployment rates. Friedman was unable to change the game in terms of the Phillips curve because such a game had hardly existed. However, thanks to Friedman, after his reinterpretation the Phillips-curve really came to the fore: it became the common language, the common denominator through which monetary-interested authors could express their views. In this term the Friedman-Lucas transition is particularly interesting. Setting aside the famous Marshall-Walras divide, the central feature of the debate between Friedman and Lucas was the focus on the shape of the Phillips curve and whether there is a distinction between the short-run curve(s) and the long-run vertical line.

From time to time we need to face the fallacies of our thinking. Some courageous authors like James Forder are not afraid to rebuild our science from the ultimate grounds. To be perfectly honest, sometimes I feel tempted to think there is no real progress in our discipline. Oftentimes it seems as if the cornerstones of economics and the history of economic thought are established once and for all. But some ambitious books such as Forder’s Phillips curve myth can be successful in reopening our most important questions. This is the reason why Forder’s book is a must: it can teach us how reshape our knowledge through sound reasoning.

Here is a review from Kevin D. Hoover, and another one from Michel De Vroey. Both are worth reading.




On the margin of the 2018 elections in Hungary

I’ve been considering for days to write something about the shocking outcome of the 2018 parliamentary elections in Hungary, held last Sunday. The first idea came to my mind was to write a detailed analysis on this historical phenomenon in order to explain what happened. But this is beyond my power and such an endeavour would be inevitably subjective – something I’d like to avoid. So I spent the last couple of days considering the events in the hope of finding something worth sharing. Something which might be subjective, but still my own opinion.

I don’t want to talk about the flow of migrants directly – evben if it was the leading and almost sole topic of the campaign. This is a threat to the whole Western World, not exclusively to Hungary. But the ultimate cause of this victory is somewhere here for sure. Hungarian people see the migrants as a threat, whilst our Western counterparts have a radically different vision. Admittedly, such a strong difference of opinion can be regarded as a result of the overwhelming media-hype over the migration crisis, but I don’t believe that a media-hype could have created something which is not inherent in the Hungarian people. Do Hungarian people hate strangers, driven by a reflex? Is this my opinion?! I don’t think so. The problem is the social status of the ‘average’ Hungarian voters. It is an age-old debt of Hungarian politics to ‘uplift’ the people, to do something about the poverty and the deprivation of the rural population. These people are justified to see the migrants as a threat since these people still live on the dole, sadly enough. Simultaneously, Western people are not afraid. For them the flow of migrants is a chance to recrute new workforce for jobs they are reluctant to do. The radical difference of opinion can be traced back to a radical and even more fundamental difference is social status. Once the Hungarian population can catch up with the Western standards in terms of income and wealth, this difference of attitude towards the migration crisis will disappear.

The sad thing is that we have politics in which it proved to be a merit to make good use of people’s deprivation and their lack of adequate information. Time will tell whether it is a viable option.


A structuralist approach to the methodology of modern macroeconomics

I am proud to say that a new book project of mine has started. In the forthcoming book to be published at Elsevier I am studying the relationship between agent-level assumptions and the possibilities of an adequate macro-level causal analysis. Following a realist philosophy of science I am interested in demonstrating that we are to distinguish causal adequacy and descriptive accurace when it comes to discuss the performance of abstract models along the Friedman-Lucas-RBC line.


The problem in analysing assumptions in economics

The common problem in discussing the design of assumptions in economics is rooted in merging two independent aspects into each other. One is descriptive accuracy: how our assumptions can provide true or realistic descriptions of reality. It is a heritage of neoclassiccal economics to abandon this purpose. The more “unrealistic” a model, the more useful it is – this is the summary of the widely believed tenet. However, this aspect tells us nothing about the causal adequacy of a model: highly abstract models with highly unrealistic assumptions (unrealistic is descriptive terms) can do a great deal about causal understanding. So this is the second aspect: causal adequacy. We are to check whether our descriptively unrealistc and false assumptions are adequate in causal terms. And they can be. The only thing to do is to highlight relevant and causally active entity properties. Unrealistic models can have unrealistic assumptions (again: unrealistic in descriptive terms) which are realistic in causal terms. This is the most important consequence of the structuralist reconstruction of business-cycle models and the famous microfoundations project along Anjan Chakravartty’s philosophy of science exerted in his A Metaphysics for Scientific Realism (Cambridge University Press, 2007).


How to write a Fulbright application?

It is a part of my mission to share the Fulbright idea and to help future candidates to submit well-established applications. After reaching a decision about your application, the next step must be to start planning. In this short note I will try to give you some useful advice on how to write a successful Fulbright application to become a visiting research fellow. Let’s see what I have…

  1. Start planning as early as possible. Completing a Fulbright application is not easy. It takes time. It is well enough to refer to the huge amount of documents you need to submit as attachments. A letter of invitation, letters of recommendation, a medical certificate, a bibliography and so forth. Moreover, fine-tuning your application is also a time-consuming phase: it is only a fairytale that one being kissed by a muse can set up a research proposal in a week. You’d better devote the necessary time to rephrase and rephrase your application time and again. Further improvement is always possible and may perfectionism be your standard. You are likely to have rigorous anonymous referees: don’t make them disappointed.
  2. Have adequate questions. When it comes to set up a research proposal, you need to show your strength and originality. You need to have something which as a scientific problem is worth attention and to which you are determined to find answers. You need to ask something that is missing from the literature, to find a gap in knowledge. What is more, you need to shed light on the nature of this gap: why and how is it there and what can you do to fill this lacuna. This is the most important aspect of an application. Your referees and – if selected – your interviewees are keenly interested in your ambitions, your questions and hypotheses. This is the level at which you can strengthen your application the most. A well-established application is established at the level of your questions and hypotheses.
  3. Have an excellent host. Reputation is not the only concern. It is more than great if you have a high-flying professor from a high-flying insitution in sight. But his or her reputation is only one part of the game. Your host has a lot to do during your preparation period, and writing your letter of invitation is only a minor part of the project. His or her excellence is a multi-dimensional variable among which his scientific fame is only one aspect. Your host’s support, i.e. the support you can receive from him or her is more important than you think. First, for intance, a great host really wants to make your story happen. Second, he or she takes it serious to assist you in writing your application: this assistance may not be more than honest criticism – but how many colleagues do you have on whom you can really rely when it comes to discussing a Fulbright application…? If you are still dubious, just think of the form of the letter of invitation. Do you think it is indifferent whether he or she writes a formal short letter…? No it isn’t. A letter saying ‘we understand you are working on a Fulbright application and if you are awarded then you will be here’ is almost nothing. If you have something like this… well, you might as well postpone submitting your application. On the contrary, a letter written in a truly warm tone can actually work as an additional letter of recommendation – and this recommendation from your host is the most important one. Your referees can judge you by this letter: how badly an American colleague wants to work with you. A great host is an expertise in his or her field and clearly knows what kind of support you need in writing your application. You are lucky if you have such a host in sight.
  4. Have excellent colleagues to write the letters of recommendation. The three letters of recommendation is also a crucial part of your project. The Fulbright Commission gives clear guidelines to your promoters as for the required content of the letters. Ask your promoters to follow these guidelines as closely as they can. They are required to introduce you to the referees and decision-makers as thoroughly as possible. Admittedly, this is demanding. Writing a good letter takes hours if not a day – you must be sure your promoters will really take the trouble to do what they are instructed to do. All in all, this is the same story as with your host: good promoters want to make your story happen and they are ready to act accordingly. So, similarly, it is not about reputation only. You need good and thick letters full of content and information about you. You need promoters who are ready to help you and whose words are worth attention.
  5. Get ready for being interviewed. If your application performed well in the hands of your referees, you will be invited to an interview. This is a great experience, I promise. Intelligent people sit in front of you, who – even if they don’t understand a single word from your project – make efforts to understand your mission. They are kind, polite and curious. But this is not an easy or informal chat. This is a lively and exciting conversation, but it really matters. Depending on the number of the interviewed applicants and the number of funded positions, the final decision is chiefly based on the impressions you made in this interview. So stay focussed.fulbright25

Remembering EIPE 20th Anniversary Conference: ‘A world to win’


On this day a year ago this fantastic conference started. It was a great experience, so I am happy to recall the flight, the city, the beautiful university and all the friendly people. I spent three wonderful days in the city, taking long walks from my hotel to the sessions every morning. Rotterdam is too big to discover in three days, so I needed to rely on some travel books and videos to get to know something about the city. Here is my favourite one, with a short summary of the conference: all the great figures of EIPE talking about the birth and the implementation of the idea. Inspiring.

Great news from Rotterdam

EIPE of Erasmus University can justifiably be regarded as a leading centre in the methodology of economics. The academic staff there have come a long way, according to some recent news.

The master Philosophy and the research master in Philosophy and Economics of the Faculty of Philosophy (Erasmus University of Rotterdam) have received great reviews in the ‘Selection Guide Masters’. The programmes have obtained the predicate ‘top opleiding 2018’ – top rated programme 2018 – due to these great reviews.

MA Philosophy

About this programme the ‘Selection Guide Masters 2018’ says: ‘Students of this programme are very satisfied with almost all aspects’. Especially the quality of the lecturers is appreciated, which includes their involvement with the students in supervision and feedback, as well as their professional know-how. The quality of the programme itself is also highly valued. This aspect entails the level of the materials, the cohesion of the used methods, and the overall quality. Finally, the students are very content with the ‘studyability’ of the programme. ‘studyability’ entails the rostering of exams and assignments, the manageability of the deadlines and the reasonableness of the number of re-sits.

Research Master in Philosophy and Economics

Like last year, the Research Master in Philosophy and Economics has received the quality label. The programme is valued highly for its excellent lecturers and the guidance which is offered. Furthermore, the programme receives high scores on the scientific training and the ‘studyability’ of the programme. The Research Master in Philosophy and Economics is the highest scoring Research Master programme in Philosophy in the Netherlands.

Top rated programme

Only 161 of the nine hundred reviewed programmes recieved the quality label called ‘top rated programme’. Mostly small scale programmes attain those top reviews.

Selection Guide Masters 2018

The Selection Guide Masters compares and reviews all master programmes at Dutch universities. The quality reviews are derived from the national student survey and from the experts from the NVAO. The Selection Guide Masters 2017 is published by the Centre for Higher Education Information.

Fulbright chronicle #2

I was running errands in the last couple of weeks. I needed to complete all the Fulbright administration within a reasonable range of time. First of all, I needed transfer my scholarship to Arizona State University (ASU) as my host and supervisor Prof. Ross Emmett started a new position there as the Director of the Center for the Study of Economic Liberty and Professor of Political Economy in the University’s School for Civic and Economic Thought and Leadership. Even though I hesitated for one day, this decision of moving to Arizona was very easy to make. Arizona State University is an excellent institution (actually a top institution: ranked as #1 in the U.S. for innovation, among the best graduate schoolsin the USA, a top producer of the world’s elite scholars and so forth) and my supervisor has so encouraging an attitude that I can hardly wait to start working with him.

My Fulbright scholarship is going to be a tour actually. It starts on 1 October with a month to spend at Regenstein Library, the University of Chicago. Then I move to Durham, North Carolina for another month (November) to do similar library research at Duke’s Rubenstein Library, mainly on the Lucas papers and the Edward Prescott papers. After this stage I go on with my work at ASU, hosted by Dr. Emmett. I can say this is a very fortunate schedule as we can have some fruitful discussions on the archival stuff I will have collected by that time.


Considering Weber’s social scientific realism

I spent the last couple of days reading. I am making efforts to reword Weber’s methodological stance through concepts I am familiar with. Here I would love to refer to entity realism and structural/causal realism. I tried to concieve what Weber would think and say in these terms.

Entity realism: this comes from the philosophy of physics, currently applied to social sciences. At the bottom line this idea is very simple: our scientific terms refer to entities that are real. There are electrons in reality and they have the properties we attribute to them. This problematic, I know. No theoretical description is full, so when an entity realist characterize electrons, he can portray only ’a slice of reality’ at best. An entity realist is unable to seize all the features of electron, but – and this is important – he attributes features to the electron that it really has. I think Weber would be an entity realist. I found a very interesting paragraph in Ringer’s Max Weber’s methodology. Referring to Mommsen, on page 118 the author writes: ideal types cannot be constructed without regard for realities. So, and this is very essential to me, Weberian abstract-theoretical ideal types are constructed (and should be constructed) so that the researcher examines reality and seize those features of the entities that are important to him as for his research interest. As I concieve ideal types, an ideal type is constructed from real features. Rationality of the homo oeconomicus is the rationality of everyday human beings – but in reality this rationality is corrupted or disturbed by a lot of mental, psychological and social (and so forth) factors. But rationality is ’out there’, it is a part of our complex picture. Following Weber we are interested in partial truths, but the elements we exaggerate in ideal types are real features of our fellow agents.

Structural/causal realism: this also comes from the philosophy of physics. To simply put, the causal/structural connections we depict in theories are real. If I tried to conceive neoclassical economics in a Weberian fashion and according to structural/causal realism, I would say: Weber is a structural realist. In these terms, however, we have only partial truths again: treading Weber’s footsteps, we seize some causal mechanisms of the complex real causal structure – but these mechanisms are real and effective causal mechanisms. I think Weber would say: in the Marshallian cross, an increase in the price would really reduce demand. That is, the mechanism underlying this basic model of market exchange is about an effectice cause-and-effect connection – much more than an empirical regularity. When I read Whimster and Bruun’s brilliant foreword to the collected methodological writings, I found a passage that seems to support my idea: on page xxvi they trace Weber’s causal notion back to Radbruch and place Weber’s causality in the context of legal responsibility. So, I think, Weber is interested in real and objective causal connections.

As far as the realism-instrumentalism debate is considered, I believe Weber is important part of the context. Let’s have Friedman’s instrumentalism: with his parable in F53 on the leaves acting as if they were able to rationally consider their positions, Friedman gives up entity realism. He argues for assumptions that can be set up neglecting the real features of entities he ’portrays’. Thus, Friedman abandons the idea of entity realism (even as partial truths). It is questionable whether Friedman was a causal realist. Accordig to Kevin Hoover, he was, but I don’t think so (I think entity realism and causal realism is a package, causall realism cannot be achieved without entity realism). To simply put, with his emphasis on predictive performance of theories, he pays no attention to the causal connections behind macro-social phenomena. I think the whole F53 paper is devoted to the idea that researchers should be uninterested in the causal connections, and it is only predictive performance that matters. In these terms, Hausman rightly debates Friedman’s methodological stance.

To have an example: there is a widely cited anecdote in statics about a ’model’ in which the number of storks is the independent and the number of newborn babies is the dependent variable. For Friedman, such a model is a useful model as long as it provides good predictions. For Weber, such a model, I think, would be unacceptable for such a model would say nothing about the real causal connections.

Is this hairrising…?


Weber and Lucas: a different narrative?

Weber and Friedman’s story featured Knight as the most probable mediator of ideas. However, if we turn to the post-Friedmanian developments in Chicago business-cycle theories, the emergence of Weberianism seems to be implausible for Knight’s effacement at Chicago’s Department of Economics. Hence, the stage for both Knight and Weberian ideas fundamentally changed after WWII (Van Horn & Mirowski, 2009). There exists a narrative according to which modern Chicago economics as an educational and scientific conception is strongly reliant upon Knight (Reder, 1982). The present consensus, however, underplays his influence. As Emmett (2011) underlines, the modern school has been working with such an institutional structure that has little to do with Knight. In the years after WWII Knight had problems finding his position in the specialized economic theorizing (Emmett, 2010; 2013).

It is dubious whether Knight’s presence in the curriculum of modern Chicago economics is enough for us to talk about institutionalized Weberianism in these years. Emmett (2009) draws attention to the fact that chapter one of Knight’s The economic organization (Knight, 1933) is still on the reading lists of Econ 301―even in Kevin Murphy’s time. This text echoes a multitude of well-known Knightian thoughts (the limited relevance of neoclassical theory, problems around dynamic economics) some of which stem from Weber (Clarke, 1991, p. 262). With neither explicit reference to Weber nor using the term ‘ideal type’, Knight briefly mentions Weber’s methodology of ideal types (footnote 5 on p. 21 and p. 28). Therefore, the text itself is a far cry from a comprehensive introduction to Weberian tenets.

Thus, the post-Friedmanian emergence of Weberianism is highly doubtful. Accordingly, studies inquisitive about the connection between Weber and Chicago economics missed extending Weberianism beyond Friedman. Focusing on Knight’s role as a mediator is a possible cause, whilst paying attention to changes in the curricula of the Department of Economics may be another one. However, in the dissemination of Weber’s ideas in the U.S. the years after WWII were significant. An expansion of Weberianism in new directions and in new scientific centres occurred in these years (Scaff, 2011, p. 273).

In Lucas’ case, however, Friedman is a possible mediator, bearing in mind F53’s Weberian reminiscences. Further possible channels might have worked during his undergraduate studies. It must be noted that in his Nobel bio Lucas (1995) places a great emphasis on his B.A. in history. History, together with anthropology, sociology, economics, psychology and political science, belongs to social scientific education. The B.A. level education of these subjects was an assignment of the College of the University of Chicago working as an autonomous administrative unit. The College established a three-year sequence of subjects in the social sciences, paralleled with similar three-year sequences in the natural sciences and humanities. This three-year sequence in the social sciences consisted of three subjects, each with a different focus (Singer, 1948). In this subject matrix the course ‘Soc 2’ (Social Sciences 2) has the most importance as far as Weberianism is considered. Under this label students studied Weber’s Protestant ethic (Weber, 1930) as a part of the theories necessary for understanding society.

A careful reading of the Protestant ethic has been an accentuated constituent of the curriculum for decades (Levine, 1992, p. 110; Schudson, 1992, p. 137), so it was in Lucas’ time, and not only in Chicago (Mims, 1952, p. 29). The reading lists featured the 1930 English edition of the Protestant ethic, translated by Parsons, to which economic historian Richard Tawney wrote a foreword (the foreword itself was also a compulsory reading). This work of Weber is a masterpiece of the application of the methodology of ideal types. In the foreword, accordingly, Tawney underlines how significant Weber’s social scientific methodology is for economics. For him, moreover, the method of the essay is as important as its conclusions (p. I(b)).

Protestant ethic is a not a systematic introduction to Weber’s methodology. The text, however, provides an effective summary of the methodology of ideal types. In the first two pages of chapter two Weber puts forward his idea about the purpose of social scientific conceptualization. It is to highlight some individual parts of historical reality and to unite them into a consistent conceptual whole―which is the ideal type. Here Weber also underlines the requirement that we ought to properly adjust our theories to the facets of reality we are interested in, though our current point of view is by no means the only possible aspect from which we can approach a social phenomenon (Weber, 1930, pp. 47-48). In a lengthy note (p. 192) Parsons also drew attention to both the significance of these principles and Weber’s revaluation of the methodology of the social sciences.

The translation history of Weber’s works is also worth attention. In the 1950s the texts indispensable to a methodological study of the Protestant ethic were all available in English. In 1927 Knight translated Weber’s General economic history (Weber, 1927), a mature form of Weber’s comparative historical sociology. The other magnum opus was the Protestant ethic. In 1934-35 Edward Shils teamed up with Henry A. Finch in Chicago translated three methodological essays (Objectivity in social science and social policy; The meaning of ethical neutrality; Critical studies in the logic of the cultural sciences), published in a single volume in 1949 (Weber, 1949). The English edition of the complete text of Economy and society providing a detailed description of the ideal type methodology came out only in 1968 (Weber, 1968/1978), though the methodological introduction (Basic sociological terms, including the famous Methodological foundations) became available as early as in 1937-38. Thanks to Shils, the text circulated among the students and the academic staff. Even though sociologists showed a more intense interest in Weber (Scaff, 2011, pp. 201-6; Sica, 2004; Derman, 2012, pp. 39-9), Weber as we have seen was an accentuated constituent of the general social scientific education in Chicago.

It is also Lucas’ Nobel bio where he mentions Belgian historian Henri Pirenne as a major influence on him. Reading Pirenne may be an additional source of Weberianism. In methodological terms, Pirenne applied the same comparative historical method as Weber advocated. Comparative method was a cultivated approach in scientific historiography, regarded as the best way of elevating history to glorious prestige. For Pirenne, comparative method served as a reality check in order to conform social scientific generalizations. In this framework, social science lead to generalizations through a process where empirical justification of the causes is a high-ranked aspect (Lorenz, 2009, pp. 399-401). As with Friedman, however, we ought to avoid overemphasizing Lucas’ exposure to Weberianism. The attitude of Chicago academics towards Weber has always been rather ambivalent, especially after political philosopher Leo Strauss’ arrival at Chicago (1949). Strauss had a very negative judgement about Weber and due to his scholarly power he could profoundly bias convictions on Weber. This likely means that when Lucas received his history degree, he might have been rather negatively affected by Strauss’ viewpoint which was widely known in those years. Such distortions might also have contributed to Weber’s turning into an implicitly cited authority in social sciences.


Clarke, S. (1991). Marx, marginalism and modern sociology. London: Macmillan.

Derman, J. (2012). Max Weber in politics and social thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Emmett, R. B. (2009). Did the Chicago school reject Frank Knight? In R. B. Emmett, Frank Knight and the Chicago school in American economics (pp. 145-155). London: Routledge.

Emmett, R. B. (2010). Specializing in interdisciplinarity. History of Political Economy, 42(S1), 261-287.

Emmett, R. B. (2011). Sharpening tools in the workshop. In R. Van Horn, P. Mirowski, & T. A. Stapleford (Eds.), Building Chicago economics (pp. 93-115). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Emmett, R. B. (2013). Frank H. Knight and the Committee on Social Thought. Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2307185

Knight, F. H. (1933). The economic organization. New York: Harper.

Levine, D. N. (1992). Classics and conversations. In J. J. MacAloon (Ed.), General education in the social sciences (pp. 103-114). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Lorenz, C. (2009). Scientific historiography. In A. Tucker (Ed.), A companion to the philosophy of history and historiography (pp. 393-403). Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.

Lucas, R. E. (1995). Biographical. Letöltés dátuma: 2018. January 24, forrás: Nobelprize.org: https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/1995/lucas-bio.html

Mims, H. S. (1952). On general education in social science at Harvard. The Journal of General Education, 7(1), 25-31.

Reder, M. W. (1982). Chicago economics. Permanence and change. Journal of Economic Literature, 20(1), 1-38.

Scaff, L. A. (2011). Max Weber in America. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Schudson, M. (1992). A ruminating retrospect on the liberal arts, the social sciences and Soc 2. In J. J. MacAloon (Ed.), General education in the social sciences (pp. 126-147). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Sica, A. (2004). Max Weber. A comprehensive bibliography. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.

Singer, M. B. (1948). The social sciences program in the College of the University of Chicago. In Social science in general education (pp. 37-74). Dubuque: WM. C. Brown Company.

Van Horn, R., & Mirowski, P. (2009). The rise of the Chicago school of economics and the birth of neoliberalism. In P. Mirowski, & D. Plehwe (Eds.), The road from Mont Pèlerin (pp. 139-180). Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Weber, M. (1927). General economic history. New York: Greenberg.

Weber, M. (1930). The protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons.

Weber, M. (1949). The methodology of the social sciences. Glencoe: The Free Press.

Weber, M. (1968/1978). Economy and society. Berkeley: University of California Press.